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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2a(3)(2)(h) (2004).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The trial court properly determined that parties to a divorce are entitled to

limit or eliminate their right to seek modification of an existing alimony award that was
the product of a settlement agreement between the parties.
Standard of Review: "A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness." Onglnt'l U.S.A. Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); see
also IHCHealth Sews. Inc. v. D & KMgrnt, Inc., 2003 UT 55 f 6, 73 P.3d 320 (noting
that under the proper circumstances, the issue of waiver may be decided through summary
judgment); Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 940 n.l (Utah
1993) (noting that the issue of waiver could, under the proper circumstances, be
determined as a matter of law). This issue was preserved for review by Appellee's Brief
Re: Modification of Issues Raised at January 22, 2006 Hearing on [Appellee's] Motion to
Dismiss. [R. 157].
2.

The trial court acted within the limits of its authority when it determined

that Appellant had failed to present evidence sufficient to support his alleged claim of a
change in circumstances.
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Standard of Review: The court of appeals reviews a trial court's denial of a
petition to modify an existing alimony award for abuse of discretion. See Bollinger v.
Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47, ^ 10, 997 P.2d 903. This issue was preserved for review by
Appellee's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce and its
supporting Memorandum. [R. 119-26].
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are determinative on this
appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In March 2000, Appellee Kallie J. Sill ("Kallie") filed a petition to end her
eighteen year marriage to Appellant Joel Gordon Sill ("Joel"). [R. 1]. The parties both
retained counsel, and after protracted negotiations, they entered into a global settlement
agreement that was subsequently adopted in whole by the trial court. [R. 94, 103].
Pursuant to the settlement, Joel was obliged to pay Kallie alimony in the amount of
$6,000.00 every month for a period often years. [R. 94 at ^ 13]. Additionally, each party
agreed to waive their right to modify the terms of the settlement, which included terms
favorable to both parties, and which was the product of informed and protracted
negotiations. [R. 94 at ^ 20]. But, contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement, in
September 2005, Joel petitioned the trial court for modification of the terms of the
parties' alimony agreement. [R. 113]. After Kallie directed the trial court's attention to
-2-

the waiver provision of the settlement agreement, as well as to the obvious absence of
anything that would support a conclusion that Joel's circumstances had substantially and
materially changed, the trial court denied Joel's motion and dismissed the claim. [R. 182].
Joel now appeals. [R. 188].
BACKGROUND
In March 2000, after eighteen years of marriage, Appellee Kallie J. Sill ("Kallie")
and Appellant Joel Gordon Sill ("Joel") decided to end their relationship and Kallie filed
a Divorce Petition in the Third District Court of Summit County. [R. 1]. Each party
retained competent counsel and after protracted negotiations, Kallie and Joel agreed to the
terms of a settlement, which disposed of all of the issues material to the divorce. [R. 76,
94]. Through the settlement, the parties agreed, in effect, to split the marital assets,
including the value of any real property that the parties had obtained while married and
Joel's accumulated retirement accounts. [R. 94 at f 3]. The parties also agreed to a
formula for the distribution of any proceeds realized through the eventual sale of the
marital home, which was being built when the relationship ended. [R. 94 at *|flf 3(f), (g),
(i), 8, 9]. During the marriage, Joel had accrued rights to certain royalty payments that
had yet to be paid, and the parties agreed to divide these equally as they were received.
[R. 94 at % 11]. Joel agreed to assume certain debt and both parties agreed to take all
actions necessary to implement the provisions of the decree, including an agreement to
jointly file their 2000 tax return and share in any tax liability for that year. [R. 94 atffif14,
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17, 18]. Finally, the parties agreed to the terms of alimony that Joel would provide Kallie.
[R. 94 at 1f 13].
Although the parties had been married for eighteen years, Kallie agreed that the
alimony should run for only ten years, and Joel agreed to pay her $6,000.00 per month
over that period. [R. 94 at *f 13]. The parties specifically agreed that the alimony
payments would cease if Kallie either remarried, cohabitated, or died before the end of
the agreed upon alimony term. [R. 94 at ^f 13]. However, to ensure that Kallie would
receive the entire alimony amount, Joel agreed to obtain a life insurance policy, naming
Kallie as the sole beneficiary, in the principle amount of $750,000.00, which
approximated the amount of alimony that Joel was expected to pay over the term of the
agreement. [R. 94 at U 15]. The settlement further provided that only after Joel had
complied with all of the terms of the settlement agreement, including payment of all
alimony, would he be permitted to either cancel the policy or name a different
beneficiary. [R. 94 at ^ 15]. Having agreed to all of the terms material to the final
dissolution of the marriage, the parties then decided to make the agreement permanent;
therefore, they agreed to waive all rights to modify any of the terms of the agreement
once it had been accepted by the trial court. [R. 94 at ^ 20]. Specifically, paragraph
twenty of the settlement states, "[t]he provisions of this Decree of Divorce shall be nonmodifiable with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and
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divided in this agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate
disposition." [R. 94 at ^ 20] (emphasis added).
The parties made no mention in the settlement agreement of Joel's income at the
time of the divorce or his historic income. Nor did the parties discuss Kallie's income or
her ability to produce income. Instead, the entire settlement agreement focused on the
parties' assets, including existing and expected liquid assets. In fact, the terms of the
alimony agreement do not appear to be based on any need versus ability analysis. The
trial court, after reviewing the terms of the settlement agreement-including the alimony
agreement-and the parties' pleadings and disclosures, adopted the settlement agreement
in whole, including the waiver provision, on March 6, 2001. [R. 94].
Both parties complied with all of the terms of the agreement until September 13,
2005, when Joel filed a Petition to Modify the Divorce Decree with the district court. [R.
113]. Through this petition, Joel asked the court to reduce the amount of alimony that he
had agreed to pay, asserting without reference to any supporting facts that he had
experienced a substantial decrease in income since the decree was entered. [R. 114 at f
4]. Kallie moved to dismiss, arguing not only that Joel failed to present the court with
any grounds that would support modification, but also that the parties-both of them-had
waived the right to modify any of the terms of the settlement, including the terms of the
alimony agreement. [R. 119, 157]. The court, after reviewing substantive pleadings
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submitted by both parties, agreed with Kallie and dismissed Joel's Petition. [R. 182]. Joel
now appeals. [R. 188].
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Under Utah law, every competent and informed individual is entitled to waive
virtually any substantive right, whether constitutional or statutory. The rights subject to
waiver range from the right to counsel to the right to appeal an adverse decision.
Moreover, the right to seek modification of the terms of an agreed-upon alimony award is
also subject to waiver, and Utah courts have recognized and enforced such wraivers.
Utah's position agrees with the position of most, if not all, of her sister states, where it
has been generally accepted that a party to a stipulated divorce agreement is fully
empowered and permitted to waive his right to seek modification of the terms of the
settlement agreement, even when the agreement includes an alimony award.
Under Utah law, as well as the law of Utah's sister states, waiver will be found
when a party has a right, knows of the right, and intentionally waives his or her right to
exercise that right. Here, it is undisputed that under Utah law parties have the right to
petition a court to modify an alimony award if the circumstances warrant the
modification. It is equally undisputed that at the time the parties entered into the
settlement agreement, they were each aware that under Utah law they had the right to seek
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modification should there be a substantial and material change of the parties'
circumstances.1 Finally, Joel has never argued that in signing the settlement agreement
and presenting it to the trial court he did not intend to waive his right to modify the
alimony terms. Moreover, the terms of the agreement are clear, and under paragraph
twenty of the stipulated decree, both parties agreed to waive the right to modify any of the
terms of the agreement, which clearly includes the terms of the alimony agreement.
Consequently, Joel's settlement waiver satisfies each of the elements required under Utah
law and the trial court properly concluded that he had waived the right to seek
modification.
Additionally, even if no waiver existed in this case, Joel has abjectly failed to
present the court with any facts to support his claim that his income substantially
decreased between the time of the decree and 2005. To successfully plead a petition to
modify, at a minimum, Joel must present the court with facts showing a material,
substantial change in circumstances. Here, he pleaded no facts at all; instead he presented
the court with a bald and unsupported conclusory statement that his income had
substantially decreased. When faced with a motion to dismiss highlighting this failure,

1

Joel did not argue before the trial court, and has made no effort to argue
here, that he was unaware of this right at the time he entered into the settlement.
Moreover, at all times relevant to this proceeding, Joel has been represented by competent
and qualified counsel who advised him at every step in the process. Thus, it should be
presumed that Joel was aware of his statutory right to modify the alimony terms when he
chose to waive that right.
-7-

rather than amend his pleading or attempt some other avenue of repair, Joel maintained
that his assertion was facially sufficient. In the absence of any facts supporting the claim,
the court properly dismissed Joel's petition.
ARGUMENT
Utah has long permitted parties to waive their substantive statutory and
constitutional rights, including the right to seek modification of the terms of an alimony
agreement. Further, many of Utah's sister states follow a similar rule, with the caveat for
all being that the waiver must be made knowingly and intelligently. In this case, the
parties stipulated to the disposition of all matters concerning their divorce, including the
amount and duration of the alimony award. They then agreed to waive any and all right
to modify any element of the stipulated decree, including alimony, and the trial court,
after examining the stipulation, adopted the stipulation as its order. Consequently the trial
court did not err in dismissing Appellant's Motion to Modify.
Moreover, assuming that the parties had not waived the right to seek modification,
as the petitioner, it was incumbent upon Appellant to plead sufficient facts to support his
alleged substantial material change in circumstances. Instead, he merely asserted in his
complaint that his income was "substantially reduced" from the time of the decree. This
is materially insufficient, and the trial court acted well within its discretion in dismissing
his claim as lacking any evidentiary basis.
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I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
THE PARTIES HAD AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED THE
RIGHT TO MODIFY THE TERMS OF THE DECREE

Joel argues that Utah law prohibits the waiver of the right to modify an agreedupon alimony award, and that as such, the trial court erred in dismissing his Petition to
Modify. However, Joel is incorrect.
Utah has long allowed competent adults to waive substantive statutory and
constitutional rights, and this includes allowing parties who agree to the terms of a
divorce settlement to waive the right to seek modification. Moreover, Utah's position
reflects the position adopted in most, if not all, of Utah's sister states and there is no
rational public policy reason to treat the waiver of the right to modify differently from the
waiver of any other substantive right.
A.

Utah Has Long Recognized that Adults Have the Right to Affirmatively
Waive Substantive Statutory and Constitutional Rights

Although Joel insists that waiver is not permitted in this context, his position is
unsupported. Utah courts have long recognized a party's ability to waive the right to
modify the terms of an alimony award contained in a stipulated divorce decree, and Joel's
assertion of a contrary position is simply incorrect. Perhaps most instructive on this issue
is Kinsman v. Kinsman. See 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Kinsman, the parties
agreed to the terms of a settlement agreement, which addressed all of the material aspects
of their divorce, including a provision wherein the petitioner waived her right to alimony.
See id. at 211. The parties presented the settlement agreement to the court and the court
-9-

adopted the agreement as its decree of divorce. See id. at 211. Within the settlement
agreement, the parties included the following provision:
"The parties hereby stipulate and agree that each party is a fit
and employable person capable of supporting himself and
herself respectively and that neither party is entitled to
alimony and both parties hereby waive the same now and
forever."
Id. at n.l (quoting language from the parties' stipulated divorce Decree). After the
divorce was final, the petitioner asked the court to modify the terms of the decree to
include alimony. See id. The petitioner argued that due to the respondent's declaration of
bankruptcy, and the effects of that action, there had been a substantial, material change in
circumstances warranting modification, even though the petitioner had waived any
present or future right to alimony. See id. The trial court, without commenting on the
decree's waiver provision, granted the petitioner's motion. See id. On appeal, the court
of appeals chastised the trial court, stating that it "decline[d] to hold that a change of
circumstances can overcome a knowing and specific waiver in a stipulation." Id. at 212.
The court explained that uto base the award of alimony on changed circumstances ignores
the finality of the terms of the stipulation which should only be overturned 'with great
reluctance and for compelling reasons.'" Id. at 212 (quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248,
1251 (Utah 1980)). The court further explained that if a party were allowed to overcome
its agreements by claiming that a "change in circumstances" has occurred, "[njothing
would prevent a party from negotiating a favorable settlement in exchange for a waiver
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.. . and sometime later, having enjoyed the benefit of the agreement and having dissipated
the assets awarded, coming back to the court to [modify the agreement]." Id. at n.2.2 The
court then proceeded to examine the settlement agreement as it would any contract. See
id. at 212. Using this analytical structure, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, but
only because the defendant had failed to perform the condition precedent necessary to
trigger the agreement's waiver provision. See id. at 212-13.
Similarly, in Reese v. Reese, the Utah Supreme Court held "that spouses or
prospective spouses may make binding contracts with each other and arrange their affairs
as they see fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in good faith . . . and do not
unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and statutory duties'" 1999 UT 75, \ 25, 984
P.2d 987 (emphasis added). And more recently, this court, in Medley v. Medley,
discussed waiver in the context of a stipulated divorce decree and held that the appellant
"must show that [the appellee] knowingly and intentionally gave up the right to obtain
support from him in the future." 2004 UT App 179, \ 8, 93 P.3d 847. Throughout its
analysis, the Medley court recognized that parties to a stipulated divorce retained the
ability to waive their substantive rights and that this ability was not precluded merely

2

The court did, however, determine that the stipulation was void for failure
of a condition precedent, and thus it relieved the Appellee of her obligation to perform
under the stipulation. See Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 213 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
This holding, however, has no application here, because the parties included no provision
in the Decree that remotely resembles a condition precedent. Consequently, Kinsman
provides no avenue of relief for Appellant in this case.
-11-

because of their status as parties to a divorce. See id. Thus, there is no question that
under Utah law that divorcing parties are permitted to waive their substantive right to
modify a stipulated divorce decree.
Additionally, outside of this context, Utah courts have accepted that any competent
party has the right to waive virtually any substantive statutory and constitutional right.
See United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,
533 Utah Adv. Rep. 21; State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, 137 P.3d 716; Lucero v. Kennard,
2005 UT 79, 125 P.3d 917; State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 124 P.3d 243; 438 Main Street v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 99 P.3d 80; In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589;
McCoy v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 2001 UT 3, 20 P.3d 901; see also Bluemel v. State,
2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d l&l; Aspenwood, L.L.C v. C.A.T., LLC,

2003 UT App 28,

73 P.3d 947; State v. Valencia, 2001 UT App 159, 27 P.3d 573; Badger v. Madsen, 896
P.2d 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, 138 P.3d 97.
For example, in State v. Cornejo, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized that a
criminal defendant could waive his or her right to a speedy trial, a substantive
constitutional right, through his own actions or the actions of his attorney. See 2006 UT
App 215 at Ylj 28, 31. In Lucero v. Kennard, the supreme court discussed a criminal
defendant's ability to waive the right to counsel, and stated that "[a] court may not
presume waiver of the right to counsel unless there is some evidence that the defendant
affirmatively acquiesced to the waiver of counsel." 2005 UT 79 at *f 25. But, the court's
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discussion made it clear that a criminal defendant was empowered to waive the right to
counsel. See id. In Schultz v. State, the court of appeals recognized that a defendant is
capable of waiving his right to appeal an adverse ruling, see 2006 UT App 105,fflf9-10,
132 P.3d 701, and in State v. Beckstead, the supreme court noted that a criminal
defendant's guilty plea operates as a waiver of most substantive constitutional rights. See
2006 UT 42, K 10, 557 Utah Adv. Rep. 66. See also Turville v. J&JProps.,

L.C., 2006

UT App 305,1f 44, 556 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (noting that under Utah law it is possible to
waive the right to appeal by accepting the benefits of a judgment in his favor).
Perhaps most important to this discussion is Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Federal
Savings & Loan, in which the supreme court addressed Utah's waiver rules and created an
integrated approach to be applied to all waiver cases. 857 P.2d 935 at 940-42. To
accomplish its task, the Soter's court was forced to address several existing decisions that
created what it described as different standards of proof. See id. at 939. The court traced
the genesis of these different standards and concluded that waiver law had become
"confused" in Utah. Id. Then, in an attempt to reconcile the confusion, the court
admitted that errors had been made, and, after a brief discussion of the aforementioned
errors, the court held "that there is only one legal standard required to establish waiver
under Utah law." Id. at 942. Thus, in Utah, "[a] waiver is the intentional relinquishment
of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or
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advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Id?
Since the issuance of the Soter 's decision, Utah courts have applied the Soter 's
analysis to a number of cases, which involved a number of legal questions. In Jensen v.
IHC Hospital, Inc., the supreme court applied the Soter's analysis to the question of
whether the defendant had waived its right to assert a defense in a medical malpractice
setting. 2003 UT 51,fflj81-92, 82 P.3d 1076. In IHC Health Services v. D & K
Management, Inc., the supreme court applied Soter's to determine whether the plaintiff
had waived its right to enforce the default provision of its lease with the defendant. 2003
UT 5, Y([ 7-9, 73 P.2d 320. In In re Estate o/Uzelac, this court applied the Soter's
analysis to determine whether the personal representative of the estate had waived his
right to claim "certain personal property." 2005 UT App 234,ffif22-24, 114 P.3d 1164.
But perhaps most illuminating are the statements that the supreme court made in In re
Discipline of Alex, 2004 UT 81, 99 P.3d 865. In that case, the court was asked to
determine whether an intervenor had "waived its right to seek reconsideration of the
March 22 order when it stipulated to the trustee's possession of Alex's property in the
context of the contempt hearing." 2004 UT 81 at Tf 20. However, although the court's
discussion of waiver in that context is illuminating, more important to the analysis of this
case is the language of the court wherein it articulated the broad application of Soter's,

3

The court also noted that "[ijn Utah, a distinct intent to waive must only be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan
Assoc, 857 P.2d 935, 942 n.6 (Utah 1993).
-14-

stating, in effect, that when the issue involves the waiver of a substantive right, as
opposed to a procedural right, the Soter 's analysis applies. 2004 UT 81 at f 21 n.2.
Consequently, there is no question that Soter's represents the articulation of waiver law in
Utah, and under Soter's and its progeny, the Soter's analysis is applicable whenever the
court is asked to examine the waiver of a substantive right, such as the right to seek
modification of an existing alimony award.
The ability to waive substantive rights is well-established in Utah, and there exists
no rational basis to preclude waiver of the right to modify an agreed-upon alimony award.
Moreover, Utah courts have recognized the right to waive the power to seek modification,
and Joel's argument to the contrary is simply incorrect.
B.

Utah's Position is Mirrored in Most, if Not All, Jurisdictions
within the United States

Mirroring the position adopted by the Utah courts, most, if not all, of Utah's sister
states have accepted that competent parties to a stipulated divorce decree are empowered
to waive their right to modify an alimony award, and that the agreements executed by
those parties should be enforced. See In re Marriage of Thornton, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380,
383 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); In re Marriage ofChristin, 899 P.2d 339, 343 (Colo. Ct. App.
1995); Bassett v. BassetU 464 So. 2d 1203, 1205-06 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985); Dimon v.
Dimon, 204 S.E.2d 148, 149 (Ga. 1974); Staple v. Staple, 616 N.W.2d 219, 226-28
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000); In re the Marriage ofGessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992); In re Marriage ofMdnnis, 110 P.3d 639, 642-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2005);
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Degenhart v. Burriss, 602 S.E.2d 96, 97-98 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004); Nichols v. Nichols, 469
N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (Wis. 1991).
For instance, in In re Marriage ofMcInnis, the Oregon Court of Appeals was
asked to review the effect of a stipulated divorce decree, which included the following
provision: '"[a]ll spousal support payments as provided herein shall be non-modifiable.55'
See 110 P.3d at 640 (alteration in original) (quoting from the parties5 settlement
agreement). After describing the agreement, the Mclnnis court asserted that its analysis
was founded on the principle that "[i]t is well established that the parties to a dissolution
proceeding 'may and often do enter into separate agreements regarding the terms of
dissolution."' Id. (citation omitted). "Once approved by the court. . . 'agreements entered
into by the parties are to be enforced as a matter of public policy.55' Id. (citation
omitted).4 The court then proceeded to address the question of "whether

4

In describing the nature of public policy, the court stated
"'It is axiomatic that public policy requires that
persons of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting, and that their contracts, when
entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held
sacred and shall be enforced by courts of
justice; and it is only when some other
overpowering rule of public policy intervenes,
rendering such agreements unfair or illegal, that
they will not be enforced.'"

In re Marriage of Mclnnis, 110 P.3d 639, 642-43 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). In general, public
policy has been defined as '""the community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health,
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waiving the right to seek a modification of spousal support contravenes the statutory
authority of the court." Id. at 645. The court noted that "[t]he waiver provision in this
case has nothing to do with the authority of the court; rather, it involves only whether the
parties may invoke it"; thus, such waivers neither implicate nor interfere with the trial
court's general authority related to modification cases. Id. The court further noted that
"adults with the capacity to do so generally are free to waive a panoply of rights, statutory
and constitutional, so long as the waiver is knowing and intentional." Id. Then, after
discussing the "panoply of rights" that Oregon allows a party to waive, the court
concluded that "a waiver of spousal support is fully enforceable as long as the terms of
the agreement as a whole are fair and equitable and the spouse is not without reasonable
means of support." Id. Therefore, the court concluded, "'[a] provision providing that no
alimony shall be paid will be enforced unless the spouse has no other reasonable source
of support.'" Id. at 646-47 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Similarly, in Loo v. Loo, although the Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that the parties had not waived the right to modify an alimony award, the court

public safety, public welfare, and the like."'" Adams v. Green Mountain R.R. Co., 862
A.2d 233, 235 (Vt. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sure.
Co., 243 F.Supp. 2d 793, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (defining public policy as "that general
and well settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellowmen, having
due regard to all the circumstances of each particular relation and situation"). Here, the parties
entered into the settlement agreement freely and with the guidance of competent and capable
legal counsel. The settlement was presented to, and adopted by, the court as its order. Neither
party was coerced to enter into the agreement and both parties benefitted from the agreement.
Consequently, there is no sound public policy reason to void the parties' agreement.
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maintained "that a waiver of the statutory right to move for modification of spousal
maintenance, if contained in a stipulation that a trial court has incorporated into a
judgment and decree of marital dissolution, is enforceable." 520 N.W.2d 740, 740 (Minn.
1994) (citing Karon v. Karon, 435 N.W.2d 501 (Minn. 1989)). The court further stated
that
[ajlthough Minn. Stat. § 518.64 provides that orders regarding maintenance
may be modified upon a showing of one of several statutory factors, in
Karon we held that a stipulation in which the parties expressly waive their
rights to modify the maintenance terms of the judgment and decree is
enforceable and that courts may not later modify the stipulated maintenance
provision.
Id. at 744 (citing Karon, 435 N.W.2d at 503). Thus, it is beyond dispute that Minnesota
allows parties to a stipulated divorce decree to waive their right to seek a modification of
the terms of their decree.
In 2000, the Michigan Court of Appeals followed a similar approach in its waiver
discussion contained in Staple v. Staple. See 616 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). In
Staple, the court was "asked to decide if parties who negotiate a divorce settlement may
forego [the] statutory right to petition the court to modify the alimony provisions and
instead agree that the agreed-upon alimony provisions are final, binding, and
nonmodifiable." Id. at 220. The court concluded that parties were indeed permitted to
waive their right to modify an agreed-upon alimony award, see id., stating that "we opt to
honor the parties' clearly expressed intention to forego the right to seek modification and
to agree to finality and nonmodifiability." Id. at 223. The court grounded its decision on
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its conclusion that Michigan's modification statute "does not [expressly] preclude the
parties from waiving their rights to petition the court for modification," id. at 226, and the
fact that the courts of Michigan have historically "enforced agreements to waive statutory
rights," id. As a result, the Staple court concluded that "the statutory right to seek
modification of alimony may be waived by the parties where they specifically forego their
statutory right to petition the court for modification and agree that the alimony provision
is final, binding, and nonmodifiable." Id. at 228.5
Both Bassett v. Bassett, 464 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Ct App. 1985), and Nichols v.
Nichols, 469 N.W.2d 619 (Wis. 1991), also have held that parties to a stipulated divorce
decree are permitted to waive their right to modify the terms of the agreement. In Bassett,
the court reaffirmed that the law in Florida, and elsewhere, was clear: "the availability of
statutory modification [of existing alimony awards] is indeed subject to being waived."

5

The Staple court noted that its decision
advances several public policies[, including] (1)
nonmodifiable agreements enable parties to structure package
settlements, in which alimony, asset divisions, attorney fees,
postsecondary tuition for children, and related matters are all
coordinated in a single, mutually acceptable agreement; (2)
finality of divorce provisions allows predictability for parties
planning their postdivorce lives; (3) finality fosters judicial
economy; (4) finality and predictability lower the cost of
divorce for both parties; (5) enforcing agreed-upon provisions
for alimony will encourage increased compliance with
agreements by parties who know that their agreements can
and will be enforced by the court[;and 6] the public policy of
requiring individuals to honor their agreements.
Staple v. Staple, 616 N.W.2d 219, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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Bassett, 464 So. 2d at 1205. In Nichols, the court stated that the law as it exists in
Wisconsin was clear, "the consent of the parties to nonmodifiable maintenance makes
such a maintenance provision enforceable notwithstanding the provision [of Wisconsin
law] that maintenance is always subject to modification." Nichols, 469 N.W.2d at 622.
The court then found that because the appellant "received a benefit-one-half of the
couple's assets" and because the appellee assumed the parties' debts, the waiver provision
did not violate public policy. Id. at 625.
Taken as a whole, it is clear that the majority of Utah's sister states agree with
Utah and allow parties to a stipulated divorce decree to waive their statutory right to
modify the terms of an agreed-upon alimony award. Such waivers do not, as a rule,
violate public policy, nor do they implicate or circumvent trial court authority. Rather,
courts around the nation view waivers simply as contractual provisions that, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, were freely and voluntarily adopted for the mutual
benefit of the parties to the agreement. As such, where a stipulated settlement agreement
contains language that clearly indicates that the parties intended to waive their
modification rights, courts should enforce the waiver provision and parties should be
estopped from attempting to seek modification.
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C.

The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the Decree as Including an
Affirmative Waiver of the Parties' Right to Seek Modification of
the Alimony Terms

Examining the plain language of the stipulated divorce decree, through the lens of
the aforementioned authority, it is clear that Joel affirmatively waived his right to modify
the alimony terms and that he did so knowingly and intelligently. "Waiver is 'the
intentional relinquishment of a known right.5" Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1354
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Mont Trucking v. Entrada Indus., 802 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990) (additional citations omitted)). "To constitute waiver, there must be an
existing right, benefit, or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it."' United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain, 2006 UT
35, ^| 22, 553 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (quoting Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n,
857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)). "[T]he statutory right to seek modification of alimony
may be waived by the parties where they specifically forego their statutory right to
petition the court for modification and agree that the alimony provision is final, binding,
and nonmodifiable." Staple, 616 N.W.2d at 228. So long as the parties waived their
rights knowingly and intelligently, courts are instructed to hold them to the benefit of
their bargains. See Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980).
In Utah, it is settled law that "spouses . . . may make binding contracts with each
other and arrange their affairs as they see fit, insofar as the negotiations are conducted in
good faith . . . and [the contracts] do not unreasonably constrain the court's equitable and
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statutory duties." Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, % 25, 984 P.2d 987. Moreover, Utah
courts have expressly determined that spousal contracts, or contracts between soon to be
ex-spouses, "are generally subject to ordinary contract principles." In re The Estate of
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1351 (Utah 1994). Therefore, if the language within a stipulated
divorce Decree demonstrates that the parties had a "meeting of the minds," Brown v.
Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), superceded by rule on other grounds as
recognized in Dayton v. Dayton, 2003 UT App 205U (Utah App. Jun 19, 2003), and is
accompanied by valid consideration, the terms of the agreement that lead to the decree
should be considered a valid and binding contract. See In re Beesley, 883 P.2d at 1351;
see also Kinsman v. Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210, 212 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). "Consideration
may be found 'whenever a promisor receives a benefit or where [a] promisee suffers a
detriment, however slight.'" Id. Moreover, Utah courts have held that parties, through
their contracts, are able to waive their "statutorily protected rights," if they do so in a
clear and unmistakable fashion. Medley, 2004 UT App 179 at <|ffi 7-8. Under this
authority, waiver will be found if it is clear that the parties to the contract "knowingly and
intelligently" waived their rights. See id. at <[ 8; see also Kinsman, 748 P.2d at 212. Once
the court determines that the parties' waiver was proper, "equity is not available to
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because someone has
come to regret the bargain made," Land, 605 P.2d at 1251, and courts will not interpose
themselves to relieve a party-in this case Joel-the obligations and limitations that he
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voluntarily assumed in the Decree. See Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 528 (Utah
1981). Finally, under clear Utah guiding law, "the underlying intent of the contract is to
be gleaned from the instrument itself; only where the language is uncertain or ambiguous
need extrinsic evidence be resorted to." Land, 605 P.2d at 1251; see also Webbankv. Am.
Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,ffi[9-10, 54 P.3d 1139 (stating that "'if the
language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions
are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the contract may
be interpreted as a matter of law'" (citation omitted)).
In the instant case, as a threshold matter, there is no dispute between the parties
that they each had a statutory right to seek modification of the decree and that at the time
that they entered into the agreement they were aware of this right. This is evidenced not
only by Joel's failure to argue anything that would contradict this fact, but also by the
language of the agreement, wherein the parties agreed to the terms that would terminate
Kallie's right to alimony, and the agreement's plain reference to modification. [R. 97. at
^ 13, 20]. Moreover, at no point during these proceedings has Joel asserted that he did
not intend to waive the modification right; instead, his arguments have focused on
attempting to show that such a waiver is impermissible under Utah law. Consequently,
Joel has conceded the intent element of the waiver analysis, and in doing so, Joel's waiver
of the right to modify should be recognized and enforced.
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Moreover, assuming that Joel presented the trial court with some argument on any
of the elements of waiver, given the clear circumstances surrounding his waiver, his
arguments should be disregarded. When the decision to divorce was made, both parties
retained legal counsel, and through said counsel, the parties entered into a protracted
negotiation through which they hammered out all of the terms of the divorce. They
agreed on the property distribution; they agreed to the distribution of the marital debt; and
they agreed to take the necessary actions to ensure that all of the provisions of the
agreement could be accomplished. [R. 97], They agreed that Kallie would receive
alimony, which would be modified only upon her death, cohabitation, or remarriage. [R.
97]. To limit Joel's responsibility, Kallie agreed that the duration of the alimony award
would run only ten years-as opposed to the eighteen available to her due to the length of
the parties' marriage-and to guarantee that Kallie would receive the entirety of the
amount due to her under the agreement, Joel agreed to obtain a life insurance policy for
the entire alimony amount and to name Kallie as the sole beneficiary. [R. 97 at 13, 15],
Finally, after including language that settled all of the issues involved in the divorce, the
parties agreed that "The provisions of this Decree of Divorce shall be non-modifiable
with the sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate disposition." [R.
97 at T[ 20] (emphasis added).
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Examining these facts through the lens provided by Utah's courts, it is clear that
both Joel and Kallie understood that their divorce implied several substantive statutory
rights, including the right to an equitable property distribution, the right to maintain
premarital property, and Kallie's right to alimony. It is further clear that the parties
understood that under Utah law the agreement alone would not settle the issues connected
to these rights, and that either party was entitled to seek modification of any of the terms
of the agreement unless the parties took action to foreclose those avenues. Thus, to
ensure that the settlement agreement was the final expression of the terms of their
divorce, and to foreclose any possible modification of the terms of the agreement, both
Joel and Kallie intentionally and permanently waived any and all rights to modify the
terms of the agreement, including the terms of the alimony agreement. Under generally
accepted principles of contract law-and the plain language of the decree-it is clear that
upon completion of the process, Joel and Kallie intended it to contain fixed terms that
were not subject to modification, and that the parties deliberately, knowingly, and
intentionally waived any right to modify the decree, including the alimony terms.
Moreover, a brief examination of the Decree demonstrates that both parties
received benefits from adopting the stipulation, and that both parties suffered some
detriment, regardless of how slight, in adopting the stipulation. For instance, Kallie gave
up her right to have the court distribute the marital property, and instead agreed to the
property distribution contained in the Decree, without outside valuation, to facilitate the
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stipulation. In addition, she agreed to limit the duration of her alimony award to a term of
ten (10) years and waived her right to seek alimony for a period of time equal to the
duration of the marriage, which lasted eighteen years. Similarly, Joel agreed to assume
full responsibility for the loan that was necessary to complete the property distribution
and to hold Kallie harmless should he default on the obligation. Finally, the stipulation
was presented to the trial court, which had a duty to ensure that no provision in the
Decree violated public policy. Consequently, the Decree, entered on March 6, 2001, was
the embodiment of the intention of the parties, it comported with Utah law, and it did not
violate public policy; therefore the settlement agreement should now be seen as an
integrated, binding contract to which the parties agreed, and to which the parties should
now be held.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ITS
DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THAT THE APPELLANT
FAILED TO SHOW ANY SUBSTANTIAL, MATERIAL
CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

Even ignoring the existence of Joel's waiver of the right to seek modification of
the terms of the alimony agreement, the trial court acted within its discretion in
dismissing his petition. Joel abjectly failed to present the court with any facts that would
have supported his claim that his income had substantially reduced over time. Joel's
approach was fatal to his petition. When seeking to modify the terms of an existing
alimony award, Joel is required to "first show that a substantial change in circumstances
has occurred "c since the entry of the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself"'"
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Bollinger v. Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47, If 11, 997 P.2d 903 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Moreover, "[w]hile
it is axiomatic that parties to a divorce decree will experience some type of economic
change after the original divorce decree is entered," id. at \ 20, "[a] temporary . . .
decrease in the payor's income does not necessarily constitute a substantial change."
Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In this case, the parties stipulated to the terms of the divorce after negotiating a
settlement and relying on the advice of their respective attorneys. The settlement contains
no reference to the rationale for the terms of the alimony agreement, and both the
settlement document and the divorce Decree are devoid of any mention of the parties'
then current incomes, Joel's ability to pay, and Kallie's need for alimony. Instead, the
settlement largely focused on the distribution of the parties' marital assets, including both
real and personal property, and it carefully identified the amount of the marital estate that
was to be awarded to Kallie. In fact, the only information in the settlement that even
remotely addresses income is found in paragraph eleven, where the parties agreed to split
evenly all royalties that Joel was to receive for work performed during the marriage. [R.
76, 97]. Thus, absent evidence not apparent in the settlement document or the decree of
divorce, Joel's income level should not be considered material to the alimony issue.
Instead, the alimony should merely be interpreted as the method chosen by the parties to
recognize Kallie's contributions to Joel's career. Thus, because the parties' relative
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incomes were not relevant to the terms of alimony, any purported change to Joel's income
level could not form the basis of a successful petition to modify.
Further, assuming that Joel's income is material to this discussion, Joel pleaded no
facts- none at all-concerning his income, either at the time of the divorce or currently. In
fact, a review of the record reveals that when the court was asked to enter a judgment
concerning the parties' divorce, it was presented with the negotiated agreement in which
the parties stipulated to the terms of the divorce. Joel's income was not discussed in that
document. Similarly, when Joel filed his petition to modify, he presented the court with
no evidence of his current income, but instead he merely asserted that his income "has
substantially decreased." (R. 113). Thus, the court was presented with no facts
concerning Joel's income. In the absence of any information concerning Joel's income,
current or historical, Joel's bald and unsupported statement cannot support his petition.
See generally Bollinger, 2000 UT App 47 at ^[11. The trial court, at Kallie's urging,
recognized this fatal flaw and declined to entertain Joel's petition. Because its decision
did not exceed the limits of its considerable discretion, this court should affirm the trial
court's action.
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CONCLUSION6
In Utah, it is settled law that a party is permitted to waive his substantive rights, so
long as the waiver is intentional. This rule applies broadly to all substantive rights,
including the right to seek modification of an agreed-upon alimony award. Moreover,
Utah's position is not unique, but instead it mirrors the position on waiver adopted by
most of her sister states.
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence overwhelmingly supports a conclusion
that Joel waived his right to seek modification of the stipulated terms of alimony.
Through a protracted and intense negotiation, with the assistance of competent counsel,
Joel agreed to each and every term that was eventually included in the settlement
agreement. From the plain language of the settlement, it is clear that Joel understood he
had the right to seek modification, but chose to waive that right to conclude the
settlement. Thus, the trial court correctly denied Joel's petition to modify.
Moreover, ignoring Joel's waiver, he failed to present the court with any facts that
could be used to support his claim that his income had substantially reduced since the
time of the divorce. Instead, he merely asserted, without support, that his income had
decreased. He made no reference to his current income level or to his income level at the
time of the divorce. Moreover, he made no effort to demonstrate factually that his income

6

Kallie also renews her request for an award of her costs and fees, which she
placed before this court in her Motion for Summary Disposition, filed April 20, 2006, on which
this court reserved decision pending its plenary review on May 23, 2006.
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levels were material to the terms of the alimony agreement as drafted. Consequently, the
trial court properly denied the Appellant his desired relief.
Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / ^ a y of September, 2006.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
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